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In 2001, the city of Bainbridge Island, Washington, faced a prob-
lem not uncommon to cities with valuable shorefront real estate. On the
one hand, homeowners and developers desired to build and improve on
shoreline lots. On the other, members of the community concerned
about the proposed construction of overwater structures in relatively pris-
tine areas pressured the city to block more development. When scientific
study revealed that certain portions of the city's shorelines were in fact
vital salmonid habitat,1 the city council adapted its policies to preserve
and protect these ecological resources.2 Before beginning the change in
earnest, the city enacted a permit moratorium to prevent frustration of its
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1. See Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-45 (Oct. 10, 2001). In the 2002 moratorium,
the city council renewed its findings of facts concerning the threats to salmonid habitat. Bainbridge
Island, Wash., Ordinance 2002-29 (Aug. 14, 2002).
2. Specifically, the city decided to change provisions of its shoreline master plan. See discus-
sion infra Part III.A.
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efforts by new development. 3 By refusing to accept permit applications,
the city bought itself time to plan for new rules regarding the building of
new overwater structures and new shoreline armoring.4
Not surprisingly, shoreland homeowners and certain local business
interests were not excited about the new policy. 5 Because any substantial
development on the shorelines required securing a permit from the city
under the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 ("SMA"), 6 the moratorium
barred both homeowners from improving their property and builders
from pursuing their livelihood in shoreline areas. 7 These offended resi-
dents and business owners sued, seeking declaratory relief in the form of
an invalidation of the moratorium as enacted.8 They succeeded initially
as the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor on the ques-
tion of the moratorium's validity.9 The Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division Two, affirmed the invalidation of the moratorium.' 0 This litiga-
tion and its resulting effects are the primary focus of this Note.
Why would a relatively mundane dispute over what amounts to a
few cubic yards of concrete warrant the extensive discussion encom-
passed in this Note? This dispute gives rise to a fundamental question
about power: What is the scope of municipal power under one of Wash-
ington's most important environmental protection laws? Additionally,
questions arise about competing normative values within environmental
protection, property rights, and responsible land use and development.
Placed against a backdrop of growing contentiousness surrounding these
issues in Washington politics, the relevance and timeliness of these ques-
tions cannot be doubted.
The identity of other interested parties in this case should not go
without comment. On one side are the plaintiff respondents, who are
3. Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-45 (Oct. 10, 2001); City of Bainbridge Island's
Opening Brief at 4-5, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 103 P.3d 244
(2004) (No. 30752-9-lI), 2003 WL 24313126.
4. "Shoreline armoring" is a term of art denoting bulkheads, seawalls, revetments, groins, or
other protective structures designed to prevent erosion. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief at
5, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 103 P.3d 244 (2004) (No. 30752-9-I),
2003 WL 24313126.
5. Response Brief at 1, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 103 P.3d
244 (2004) (No. 30752-9-Il), 2004 WL 3775337.
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(2) (2006) ("A substantial development shall not be under-
taken on shorelines of the state without first obtaining a permit from the government entity having
administrative jurisdiction under [the Act].").
7. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 864, 103 P.3d 244, 247 (2004).
8. Id. at 862, 103 P.3d at 245-46.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 868, 103 P.3d at 249.
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private property owners, joined by local construction industry interests."'
On the other side is a small municipality. As the case moved towards the
Washington Supreme Court, each side's list of friends grew. The Build-
ing Industry Association of Washington, Washington Association of
Realtors, and Pacific Legal Foundation filed amicus briefs on behalf of
the property owners. Washington Environmental Council, Futurewise,
People for Puget Sound, various state agencies,12 and Snohomish County
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the city. With a few exceptions, these
parties represent the participants in the cacophonous meta-debate over
private property rights and environmental protection in Washington.
Indeed, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island marks yet another round in
that ongoing contest.'
3
Prior to Biggers, the existence of municipal power to use moratoria
was not always certain under Washington law. While it was settled law
under various land use planning statutes, including the Planning Com-
missions Act, Planning Enabling Act, and Growth Management Act
("GMA"), that municipalities had the power to enact moratoria, the ques-
tion of whether municipalities could enact permit moratoria specifically
under the SMA remained unanswered.
The court of appeals reached an unfortunate and incorrect result in
Biggers, and the Washington Supreme Court-or, should it fail, the state
legislature-should take immediate steps to remedy the situation. The
Biggers court's holding ignores precedent regarding state constitutional
law, creates a trap for municipalities with shorelines inside their jurisdic-
tional boundaries that simultaneously plan under the GMA or the Op-
tional Municipal Code ("the Code"), and risks malignant practical prob-
lems. Further, the court misinterprets the fundamental structure of
Washington law pertaining to municipal power over land use planning
and, by adhering to strict textualism in interpreting the SMA, also misin-
terprets the legislative intent behind the SMA.
A rule that allows for permit moratoria in one part of a municipal-
ity's jurisdiction but not in another-namely, its shorelines-creates an
irrational incongruity in land use planning and regulation. After Biggers,
municipalities with shorelines in their jurisdiction may employ moratoria
to preserve the status quo while altering their master plans over every
11. The joined parties were Sealevel Bulkhead Builders and Home Builders Association of
Kitsap County. See Biggers, 124 Wash. App. 858.
12. These agencies were the Washington State Department of Ecology and the Washington
State Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development; the latter is the state agency
charged with administering the Growth Management Act.
13. It is not the focus of this Note to review the entire scope of the debate about land use regu-
lation in Washington; rather, it is only to call attention to this litigation, as yet another "battle" in an
ongoing "war" over property rights and environmental protection.
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part of their physical jurisdiction, except for a 200-foot-wide strip of land
along the shoreline above the ordinary high water mark. 14
The court's holding also risks significant practical problems that
undercut effective land use planning. First, with no power to enact mora-
toria to preserve the status quo on its shorelines, Washington's vested-
rights doctrine 15 would allow for end runs around new shoreline regula-
tions and lead to piecemeal shoreline development-effectively contra-
vening the purposes of the SMA.16 Second, due to the predictable influx
of permit applications after notice of pending changes to a shoreline mas-
ter plan is given, municipalities have an incentive to proceed hastily,17
giving short shrift to scientific findings, drafting poorly, or potentially
violating due process-all of which could lead to costly and unnecessary
litigation. Finally, a municipality may choose to work backward by en-
acting a draconian shoreline master plan and subsequently amend the
plan to loosen regulations over time. Under this approach, municipalities
risk a statutory violation, or even a determination of unreasonable use of
the police power, which may constitute a regulatory taking. 8
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(f) (2006). The term "ordinary high water mark" has a
technical definition in Washington:
[It is] that mark that will be found by examining the bed and banks and ascertaining
where the presence and action of waters are so common and usual, and so long continued
in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil a character distinct from that of the abutting
upland, in respect to vegetation as that condition exists on June 1, 1971, as it may
naturally change thereafter, or as it may change thereafter in accordance with permits is-
sued by a local government or the department.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 173-22-030(11) (2006). In its more general terms, this boundary line has been
used since the time of Justinian to mark the line separating what is public domain and private prop-
erty, see Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1984), and is enunci-
ated within the Washington Constitution. See WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. All land shoreward
from the ordinary high water mark is subject to the public easement. The legislature used this
boundary line to define the regulatory jurisdiction of the SMA. The SMA thus regulates land use
from the ordinary high water mark to 200 feet shoreward from that point. See WASH. REV. CODE §
90.58.030(2)(f) (2006).
15. The vested-rights doctrine holds that submission of a permit compliant with current regula-
tions (usually a permit to develop land) vests a property right in that particular use. See discussion
infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying footnotes.
16. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 ("There is, therefor[e], a clear and urgent demand for a
planned, rational, and concerted effort . . . to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordinated and
piecemeal development of the state's shorelines."); see also discussion infra Part II.A.4.
17. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Snohomish County at 18, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island,
156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006) (No. 77150-2), 2006 WL 937647.
18. A regulatory taking occurs when a regulation imposes such a loss in value in property that
it amounts to a taking under the Fifth Amendment and necessitates compensation. Justice Holmes
first elucidated the concept in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, when he stated that "[t]he general
rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Modem courts determine whether a
taking has occurred by balancing the interests of a property owner in his or her investment-backed
expectations for the parcel against the interests of the public in the regulation of public safety, health,
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A holding that municipalities do have the power to enact permit
moratoria without exceeding their authority under the SMA is both war-
ranted and legally defensible. Part II first contains an examination of the
sometimes overlapping land use codes under which cities like Bainbridge
Island plan. Second, the Part discusses grants of authority to enact mora-
toria in other land use planning statutes. Part III then provides a synopsis
of Biggers and the court's holding, along with an analysis of both the
legal and practical problems with the court's decision, as well as reaction
to the case in another jurisdiction. In Part IV, three solutions to the legal
problems before the Washington Supreme Court are presented. The
strengths and weaknesses of two arguments presently before the court
will be evaluated; Part IV subsequently proposes a solution to the issue
not presently being argued.
II. THE INTRICATE WEB: LAND USE REGULATION IN WASHINGTON
Bainbridge Island, like countless cities and towns in Washington,
plans under a set of laws that often overlap. An intricate web of land use
codes, environmental protection statutes, constitutional provisions and
related doctrine, and local ordinances guide and bind local governments.
For the purposes of this Note, only the parts of the web relevant to the
dispute in Biggers will be discussed: the Washington Constitution's po-
lice power provision, the GMA, the Code, and the SMA.
A. Municipal Planning Authority in Washington
Municipal land use planning authority in Washington derives from
multiple sources, ranging from the general delegation of police power in
the state constitution to specific statutes detailing both the substance and
process of planning. In addition, other natural features of municipalities'
physical jurisdiction, such as shorelines, are managed by statute. Before
delving into the question of whether the SMA is substantively different
in its grant or restriction of municipal power, an exploration of the varied
and welfare. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). The Penn
Central Court noted that a taking may more readily be found when the interference of the property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government. Id. at 128 (citing United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)). In the watershed case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
the Court clarified "the physical invasion" exception to the Penn Central balancing test and held that
regulation depriving land of all economically beneficial use is a "total taking" not requiring a case-
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced by the regulation in question. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992); accord Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993) (importing the Lucas rule
into Washington's takings jurisprudence). In addition to pure regulatory takings analysis,
Washington courts apply substantive due process analysis in order to protect fundamental property
rights. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990). See
generally Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495,
513 (2000).
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statutes, case law, and doctrines governing municipal power over land
use planning in Washington will prove useful.
1. Constitutional Authority to Regulate Land Use
Municipalities in Washington, as part of a generalized grant of po-
lice power under the Washington Constitution, 19 have the authority to
enact land use plans "unfettered by any enabling act.' '20 In Washington,
the delegated police power is extensive, though not plenary.2' Recently,
the Washington Supreme Court revisited the question of the extent of
municipal police power in Weden v. San Juan County.22  Owners and
operators of personal watercraft brought an action against the county
challenging the validity of an ordinance issued by the county that banned
the use of personal watercraft on all marine waters of San Juan County,
23subject to a few exceptions not germane to this discussion. The court
noted that the police power is firmly rooted in the history of this state and
that municipal police power extends as far as state police power when the
subject matter of the ordinance is local and does not conflict with the
general laws. 24  Enunciating a three-part test, the court continued its
longstanding deferential treatment of local ordinances enacted under the
police power clause:2 5 "We will find the Ordinance consistent with arti-
cle XI, section 11 of the state constitution unless: (1) the Ordinance con-
flicts with some general law; (2) the Ordinance is not a reasonable exer-
cise of the County's police power; or (3) the subject matter is not lo-
cal. 26
19. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11 ("Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce
within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws.").
20. RICHARD L. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1.3 (1983).
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B and notes 181, 183.
22. 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998).
23. Id. at 684, 958 P.2d at 276.
24. Id. at 692, 958 P.2d at 280 (quoting Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash. 2d 874, 878, 905
P.2d 324, 326 (1995)).
25. Indeed, Washington's municipalities have historically been entitled to deference when
enacting legislation under the police power. See Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 932,
481 P.2d 9, 11 (1971) ("[Article XI, section 11] is a direct delegation of the police power as ample
within the limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its
exercise so long as the subject matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the
general laws.") (quoting Detamore v. Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 326, 145 P. 462,463 (1915)). But see
infra Part IV.B and notes 181, 183.
26. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 692, 958 P.2d at 280. This three-part test is perhaps best de-
scribed as a limitation of the so-called "home rule" doctrine. Home rule is another term for local
sovereignty. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that cities have the power to "deter-
mine for themselves, and in their own way, the many important and complex questions of local
policy which arise... " Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 234, 105 P. 471,474 (1909).
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2. The Growth Management Act
The GMA was conceived as a statewide solution to land use plan-
ning, an area of regulation typically performed by local governments.27
The GMA mandates a system of comprehensive land use planning by
local governments throughout the state.28 Within the GMA, the legisla-
ture enumerated thirteen goals to be advanced by the development and
implementation of comprehensive plans. 29 These purposes range from
the promotion of urban growth, the protection of the environment, and
the reduction of sprawl, to the maintenance and enhancement of natural
resource industries and the protection of private property rights.3°
While counties and municipalities perform the actual planning un-
der the GMA, the legislature has developed common features that must
be present in each plan.31 These planning requirements include the pro-
tection of critical areas,32 siting of essential public facilities,33 and con-
current development of transportation to accommodate new growth.34
The city of Bainbridge Island plans under the GMA.35 As a city lo-
cated within Kitsap County, which is a county that must plan under the
GMA, the city is also bound by the strictures of the Act. 36 Its first com-
prehensive plan was developed in 1994, and the plan was subsequently
updated in 2004. 37 As explained below, the GMA also grants munici-
palities planning thereunder the authority to enact moratoria.38
3. The Optional Municipal Code
Land use in Bainbridge Island is also governed in part by the
Code. 39  Enacted in 1967, the Code is a strict, but optional, statutory
27. See G. Richard Hill & Angela Luera, Overview of Washington Growth Management Act, in
WASHINGTON GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT A-2, A-2 (Wash. Law Sch. Found. ed., 1992).
28. Id. at A-3. Not all cities and counties must plan under the GMA. The GMA sets out spe-
cific parameters that specify which local governments must plan. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040
(2006).
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2006).
30. Id.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070 (2006); Hill & Luera, supra note 27, at A-4.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(2) (2006); Hill & Luera, supra note 27, at A-5 to -6.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(3) (2006); Hill & Luera, supra note 27, at A-5 to -6.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.060(6)(a)(iii)(A)-(F) (2006); Hill & Luera, supra note 27, at
A-5 to -6.
35. See City of Bainbridge Island, About Island Government, http://www.ci.bainbridge-
isl.wa.us/default.asp?IDl=348 (last visited Jul. 22, 2007).
36. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(l) (2006).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 36.70A.390; see discussion infra Part II.B.2.
39. See City of Bainbridge Island, About Island Government, supra note 35.
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framework of municipal power.4° If a city does not wish to develop its
own set of municipal regulations, it may elect to opt in to the Code's
provisions, 4' becoming what is called a "code city. ''42 The Code splits
municipalities into two categories: charter and noncharter.43
Code cities retain some measure of autonomous authority under the
Code. Specifically, the legislature inserted the following statement of
purpose into it: "The general grant of municipal power conferred in this
chapter and this title ... is intended to confer the greatest power of local
self-government consistent with the constitution of this state and shall be
construed liberally. 44 Conferral of power to local governments in this
manner is consistent with Washington's home-rule doctrine.45
The Code contains provisions to guide the land use planning and
zoning process for Code cities. 46 To that end, it provides statutory au-
thority to Code cities to enact moratoria, subject to some procedural con-
straints.47 The city of Bainbridge Island relied in part upon the Code in
order to validate its moratorium ordinance. As explained below, this ar-
gument failed.48
4. The Shoreline Management Act
Primarily, the SMA embodies the legislature's response to a "clear
and urgent demand for a planned, rational, and concerted effort ... to
prevent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the
state's shorelines. 4 9 The SMA became law in 1971, following a signifi-
cant court decision, known as Lake Chelan,50 and public demands for
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.01.010 (2006). The Code provides an alternative to the basic
statutory classification system of municipal government. See id. It was designed to provide broad
statutory home rule authority in matters of local concern. See id. Any unincorporated area having a
population of at least 1500 may incorporate as a "code city," and any city or town may reorganize as
a code city. Code cities with populations over 10,000 may also adopt a charter. SETTLE, supra note
20, at § 1.4.
41. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35A.02.010-.140 (2006).
42.Id. § 35A.01.035.
43. See id. § 35A.01.010. Bainbridge Island does not have a charter and is thus called a non-
charter code city. City of Bainbridge Island, About Island Government, supra note 35.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A. 11.050 (2006).
45. See discussion supra note 26.
46. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35A.63.010-280 (2006).
47. Id. § 35A.63.220; see also discussion infra Part 11.B.2.
48. See discussion infra Part III.B.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2006).
50. Wilbour v. Gallagher (Lake Chelan), 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). For more on
the Lake Chelan decision, see Charles E. Corker, Thou Shall Not Fill Public Waters without Public
Permission-Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WASH. L. REV. 65 (1969); Edward A.
Rauscher, The Lake Chelan Case-Another View, 45 WASH. L. REV. 523 (1970); and Geoffrey
Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971,49 WASH. L. REV. 423, 425 (1974).
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legislative response.5 Structurally, the SMA divides jurisdiction be-
tween the municipalities and the Washington State Department of Ecol-
ogy ("Ecology"). Municipalities initiate and administer the program,
52
while Ecology supervises and reviews shoreline plans pursuant to its au-
thority under the Act.
53
Prior attempts at legislating development management on the
State's shorelines met with failure, but after Lake Chelan, legislative
progress took the form of an alternative to the citizen's initiative.5 4 The
SMA was submitted to the people, along with the citizen's initiative, and
the SMA prevailed in the 1972 general election. 55 That the choice was
made in this fashion might reflect a longstanding commitment to the
primacy of local decision making in local matters. This focus on local
control of planning decisions is not an anomaly in Washington govern-
ance, as has been demonstrated by the review of the other planning stat-
utes in place.56
For the purposes of the discussion in this Note, the salient differ-
ence between the legislature's alternative measure and the citizen's ini-
tiative is the source of power over shoreline management decisions. In
the SMA, primary planning and administrative responsibility rests in the
hands of local governments, while under the citizen's initiative, such re-
sponsibility would have been held by Ecology.57 While Ecology shares
power with local governments under the SMA,58 that authority is limited
to disapproval of shoreline master programs and suggested modifica-
tions.5 9 The scope and importance of local control under the SMA indi-
cates that the legislature intended municipalities to retain at least some
autonomy to regulate their shorelines. After Biggers, that autonomy
seems considerably constrained.6 °
51. Crooks, supra note 50, at 424.
52. SETTLE, supra note 20, § 4.1 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (1982)).
53. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.080(2) (1982)).
54. Crooks, supra note 50, at 424.
55. Id.
56. See discussion supra Part ll.A.1-3. Recall that article XI, section 10 of the Washington
Constitution is another example of the State's emphasis on local control. It establishes that any city
with a population of 20,000 or more has the authority to frame a charter for its own government,
subject to the constitution and laws of the state. Michael Sebree, Comment, One Century of Consti-
tutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 159 (1989) (citing WASH. CONST.
art. Xl, § 10).
57. Crooks, supra note 50, at 424.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (2006).
59. Id.
60. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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As a planning and management scheme, the SMA is procedurally
similar to the other land use planning statutes in Washington.6' Under
the SMA, affected municipalities must create and maintain a shoreline
master plan,62 evaluate permit applications for consistency with the
plan,63 and issue development permits for conforming uses.64 This pro-
cedure is akin to what is required of municipalities under the GMA and
other zoning and planning statutes.
One central difference between the SMA and other land use plan-
ning acts is the uniform level of authority conferred to municipalities
under the act. Washington-like several other states---classifies munici-
palities and tailors the scope of their land use planning authority accord-
ing to their population size, so that smaller localities have less planning
power than larger ones.65 Under the SMA, however, all local govern-
ments are given the same level of responsibility provided that there are
"shorelines of the state" within their jurisdictional boundaries.66 The city
of Bainbridge Island is surrounded by shorelines and is thus subject to
the requirements of the SMA.
While acknowledging that the adoption of a shoreline management
plan ("SMP") is essentially a shoreline comprehensive planning and zon-
ing ordinance, Ecology reports that "[s]ome local governments maintain
'stand alone' SMPs, while other SMPs are integrated into [GMA] plans
and ordinances. 67 Interestingly, the Biggers court did not recognize the
61. See, e.g., §§ 36.70A.070-.080 (comprehensive planning under GMA); §§ 35.63.080-100
(comprehensive planning under the Planning Commissions Act); §§ 36.70.320-.350 (comprehensive
planning under the Planning Enabling Act); §§ 35A.63.060-.070 (comprehensive planning under the
Code); see also SETTLE, supra note 20, § 1.8.
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.080 (2006).
63. Id. § 90.58.140(2)(b).
64.1d. §§ 90.58.140-.143.
65. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLuM. L. REV.
346, 349 n.23 (1990).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.040 (2006). Under the SMA,
'[s]horelines' means all of the water areas of the state, including reservoirs, and their as-
sociated shorelands, together with the lands underlying them; except (i) shorelines of
statewide significance; (ii) shorelines on segments of streams upstream of a point where
the mean annual flow is twenty cubic feet per second or less and the wetlands associated
with such upstream segments; and (iii) shorelines on lakes less than twenty acres in size
and wetlands associated with such small lakes.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(d) (2006). The term "shorelands" is defined as:
those lands extending landward for two hundred feet in all directions as measured on a
horizontal plane from the ordinary high water mark; floodways and contiguous floodplain
areas landward two hundred feet from such floodways; and all wetlands and river deltas
associated with the streams, lakes, and tidal waters which are subject to the provisions of
this chapter; the same to be designated as to location by the department of ecology.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(f) (2006).
67. Patricia E. Salkin, Integrating Local Waterfront Revitalization Planning Into Local Com-
prehensive Planning and Zoning, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 229 (2005) (quoting Department of
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s congruency between the GMA and the SMA, with respect to plan inte-
68gration.
B. The Moratorium: An Essential Tool in Land Use Planning
Moratoria serve an essential function for careful land use plan-
ners. 69 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency recognized that "mora-
toria. .. are used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status
quo while formulating a more permanent development strategy. 7 ° In
fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that
"[m]oratoria ... are an essential tool of successful development.",71 One
court has flatly stated that planning without a moratorium would be like
"locking the stable after the horse is stolen."
7 2
This Section will explain the purposes and uses of permit moratoria
in the land use context, recount the legislature's effort to codify proce-
dures for the use of moratoria, evaluate judicial interpretation of that ef-
fort, and explore other jurisdictions' treatment of moratoria power in the
absence of an express statutory grant of authority by the legislature.
1. Purposes and Uses of Moratoria
When a municipality desires to retain the status quo in the face of
uncertainty with regard to future land use, it may utilize one of the most
common tools in its regulatory repertoire: the permit moratorium.73 A
permit moratorium is typically classified as a short-term suspension of
permit review, rather than a prohibition on a certain activity.74 Arguably,
if the municipality has authority to issue development permits after
evaluating requests by developers, it may choose to refuse to issue any
Ecology, Local Planning, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/sma/localplanning/index.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2006)).
68. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1
69. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337-38
(2002).
70. Id at 337.
71. Id. at 387-88; see also id. at 337 n.32 (citing to numerous state courts recognizing morato-
ria as a planning tool rather than a regulatory taking).
72. Downham v. City Council of Alexandria, 58 F.2d 784, 788 (E.D. Va. 1932).
73. The other tool is interim zoning, where the "new restrictive zoning is temporarily
imposed ...." SETTLE, supra note 20, § 2.14. In some states the distinction may not matter, but in
Washington the two are not functional equivalents. Id. The difference stems from the possible
vesting of rights during the moratorium period. See discussion of the vested-rights doctrine infra
notes 76-77.
74. E.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D. Wash.
1996).
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permits at all until the changes to the underlying permit qualifications are
enacted.
Municipalities use permit moratoria primarily to prevent individual
developers from frustrating attempts to change a comprehensive plan by
acquiring vested rights. 75 Washington's vested-rights doctrine is unusual
76in American jurisdictions. Under Washington's rule, a right to build
vests when a property owner applies for a permit, as long as the permit is
thereafter issued and conforms to any applicable ordinances and codes in
force at the time of its issuance. 7 A validly enacted permit moratorium
would thus effectively eliminate the vesting of rights during the time pe-
riod in which the permit moratorium remains in force.
Prior to the enactment of Washington's moratoria provisions, 78 an
interim zoning ordinance was validated even though it did not conform
to statutorily prescribed procedures.79 In Jablinske v. Snohomish County,
the court upheld an interim ordinance altering the zoning near Paine
Field in anticipation of an upcoming expansion of the airport. 80 The peti-
tioners had challenged the ordinance after the county denied their permit
application for the construction of multifamily housing.81 In rejecting the
petitioners' argument, the court stated: "[T]he better-reasoned view rec-
ognizes that if notice and hearing requirements were applied to interim
zoning decisions, developers could frustrate effective long-term planning
by obtaining vested rights to develop their property. 82
75. Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 851, 626 P.2d 543, 545 (1981).
76. See W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 394 (Utah 1980). Washington
rejects the general rule that vested rights can be protected against future zoning changes if a devel-
oper has substantially changed position in reliance on the permit. Id. Compare Gregory Overstreet
& Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest: Washington's Vested Rights Doctrine
Beats the Rest, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1043 (2000), with Roger D. Wynne, Washington's Vested
Rights Doctrine: How We Have Muddled a Simple Concept and How We Can Reclaim It, 24
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 851 (2001).
77. See SETTLE, supra note 20, § 2.7(b) (citing Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856
(1958)). This is not meant to be a precise statement of the entire vested-rights doctrine, as the true
meaning and force of the rule is up for debate. Rather, it is intended to inform the reader of the basic
premise of the rule, in order to enhance understanding of the motivations behind enacting permit
moratoria in the face of changing comprehensive plans.
78. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
79. Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 851, 626 P.2d 543, 545 (1981).
80. Id. at 849-50, 626 P.2d at 544.
81. Id. at 849, 626 P.2d at 544.
82. Id at 851, 626 P.2d at 545. The court continued: "[tihis is especially true in Washington
where an owner's right to use his property under existing zoning vests upon the application for a




2. Statutory Provisions for Moratoria: The 1992 Amendments
The state legislature codified municipal power to enact moratoria
by amending six statutes in 1992.83 It placed the moratoria provisions in
a number of planning statutes, including the Planning Commission Act,
Planning Enabling Act, GMA, and the Code.84 In the final bill report on
the amendments, the legislature articulated the primary reasons for pro-
viding procedures for moratoria: avoiding overtaxing existing infrastruc-
ture, avoiding a rush of development in anticipation of more restrictive
land use regulations, allowing time for the considered development of a
master plan; and preventing the despoliation of water or air.
85
Each amendment enacted with this bill possesses identical core lan-
guage:
[The governing body of a county, city, or town] that adopts a mora-
torium, interim zoning map, interim zoning ordinance, or interim
official control without holding a public hearing on the proposed
moratorium, interim zoning map, interim zoning ordinance, or in-
terim official control, shall hold a public hearing on the adopted
moratorium, interim zoning map, interim zoning ordinance, or in-
terim official control within at least sixty days of its adoption,
whether or not the board received a recommendation on the matter
from the commission or department. If the [governing body] does
not adopt findings of fact justifying its action before this hearing,
then the [governing body] shall do so immediately after this public
hearing. A moratorium, interim zoning map, interim zoning ordi-
nance, or interim official control adopted under this section may be
effective for not longer than six months, but may be effective for up
to one year if a work plan is developed for related studies providing
for such a longer period. A moratorium, interim zoning map, in-
terim zoning ordinance, or interim official control may be renewed
for one or more six-month periods if a subsequent public hearing is
held and findings of fact are made prior to each renewal.86
As written, the statute presents an interesting question of whether
the provision is an express grant, or rather a limitation on an already ex-
isting power held by municipalities.87 Parsing and interpreting the
83. Moratorium and Interim Zoning-Public Hearings, 1992 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 207
(West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE Titles 35, 35A, 36, and 70).
84. Id.; see also Wynne, supra note 76, at n.161. The amendment also inserted the moratorium
provision into the Code.
85. SUBSTITUTE S. FINAL BILL REP. 52-5727, Reg. Sess., at I (Wash. 1992).
86. Moratorium and Interim Zoning-Public Hearings, ch. 207, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 940
(codified at WASH REV. CODE §§ 35.63.200, 35A.63.220, 36.70.795, 36.70A.390, 70.05.160).
87. This question was posed immediately after the bill's passage. S. 52-5727, Reg. Sess., at 2
(Wash. 1992) ("It is not clear if these statutes limit the circumstances under which any
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language of the provision begins with an examination of the passage:
"[a] council or board that adopts a moratorium .... ,88 Without any sort
of granting language, such as "may," the clause is unclear about the
source of the power. If the first sentence of the statute stated "[a] council
or board may adopt a moratorium," one would agree that the language
expressly granted authority to municipalities employing the statute. As
the language is written, however, one may infer that the power to enact a
moratorium derives from another source, such as the municipality's char-
ter or its constitutionally delegated police power.89  Further, language
found elsewhere in the statute-"[a] moratorium . . . adopted under this
section"90 -is not accompanied by any further granting language. Ar-
guably, this indicates that the relationship between the statute and the
moratorium power is not one where the statute contains the grant of
moratorium power. Rather, the language indicates that power to wield
the moratorium tool exists independently of the statute, but that the mu-
nicipality may use the tool it already possessed while planning under the
statute, subject to the procedural restraints detailed in the section.91
Viewed in this light, the statute may not grant power; instead, it might
only circumscribe the use of power when a municipality employs the
moratorium tool to effectuate the statute.
Notably absent from the 1992 amendments is any mention of the
SMA. As such, the SMA contains no provision concerning moratoria
whatsoever. Legislative history surrounding the amendments is scant, but
the original Senate bill was far broader in substantive scope.92 In the lan-
guage of that legislation, the words "shorelines" and "wetlands" appear, 93
possibly indicating that the Senate might have had the SMA in mind
when drafting the bill. Once the bill went to the House of Representa-
tives, it was revised into the form present in the final legislation. 94 The
moratoria... may be adopted, or whether general authority to establish moratoria ... remains and
the statutes only restrict moratoria ... as defined under the legislation.").
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.200 (2006) (emphasis added).
89. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.200 (2006) (emphasis added).
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. Contra Matson v. Clark County Bd. of Comm'rs, 79
Wash. App. 641, 646, 904 P.2d 317, 319 (1995) (rejecting this line of argumentation by interpreting
the language as an express grant).
92. S.B. 5727, 1991 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1991).
93. Id. at 2. Shorelines and wetlands are included in the proposed bill's definition section as
"facilities." Id. The bill prescribed conditions under which a permit-granting agency could enact a
moratorium in order to respond to a facilities- or resource-based emergency. Id. at 3.
94. Washington State Legislature, History of Bill: SB 5727,
http://dlr.leg.wa.gov/billsummary/default.aspx?year=1991&bill=5727 (last visited July 28, 2007).
On February 28, 1992, the local-government committee in the State House of Representatives rec-
ommended passage with amendments. Id. The so-called "amendments" were really a complete
rewrite of the bill that resulted in its final adopted form.
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result was legislative silence on the moratoria power of local govern-
ments administering the SMA.
3. Judicial Interpretations of the 1992 Amendments
Prior to its decision in Biggers, Division Two interpreted the statu-
tory language regarding moratoria in the Planning Commissions Act95 as
an express grant of authority. Recently, in Matson v. Clark County
Board of Commissioners, the court addressed landowners' challenges to
two emergency ordinances enacted in 1993.96 One of the ordinances was
a temporary ban on new cluster subdivisions, properly characterized as a
moratorium. 97  The court emphasized the now-familiar language-a
"moratorium ... adopted under this section"--and interpreted it as "au-
thoriz[ing] the enactment of a moratorium... by the Board. 98 Perhaps
foreshadowing its disposition in Biggers, the court rejected an argument
by the property owners that the statute limits, as opposed to authorizes,
municipal power to enact temporary moratoria. 99 The court opined that
any other reading would render the emphasized language superfluous
because no other language was present in the Act which would serve to
authorize counties to enact moratoria.100
The character of argumentation in Matson was no doubt substan-
tially different from that in Biggers because the Matson court had spe-
cific statutory language to interpret, rather than trying to assign meaning
to legislative silence.101 Nevertheless, the dispute underlying the court's
cursory discussion of the real purpose of the phrase "adopted under this
section" is very much at the heart of both cases. While the Matson court
considered itself bound by the strictures of statutory interpretation, 10 2 the
opinion fails to fully explain why the argument of limitation rather than
authorization renders the language superfluous. 10 3 By venturing down
the path of least resistance, the court arguably reached the proper result.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.200 (2006) (emphasis added). The Planning Commissions Act
is Washington's first land use planning statute. See SETTLE, supra note 20, § 1.4.
96. Matson, 79 Wash. App. at 643, 904 P.2d at 318.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 645-46, 904 P.2d at 319. Also, the court noted that the provision "specifically au-
thorizes interim zoning controls and moratori[a] under the GMA." Id. at 646, 904 P.2d at 320.
99. Id. at 644-46, 904 P.2d at 319-20.
100. Id. at 645-46, 904 P.2d at 319.
101. Recall that the statutory language concerning moratoria is not found anywhere within the
SMA. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (2006).
102. Matson, 79 Wash. App. at 645, 904 P.2d at 319 (citing Wash. Econ. Dev. Fin. Auth. v.
Grimm, 119 Wash. 2d 738, 746, 837 P.2d 606, 610-11 (1992)) ("We construe statutes so that no
clause, sentence, or word is superfluous, void, or insignificant.").
103. Id. at 645-46, 904 P.2d at 319.
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This approach is certainly not inappropriate, but one which hindered the
same court later in Biggers.
Moreover, Washington's moratoria provisions have been accepted
by a federal court as valid zoning tools.104 The court in Sprint Spectrum
did not need to reach the question of whether the moratoria authority en-
compassed constitutionally derived police powers with statutory guide-
lines or a specific grant of authority under the statute, as the validity of
the moratorium at issue before the district court was only a threshold
question to the ultimate issue of whether the moratorium was in conflict
with federal law. 10 5  The court accepted that it was valid under the
Code 10 6 and did not conflict with federal law.
10 7
4. Moratoria Power in Other Jurisdictions
Because the SMA does not expressly confer moratoria authority to
municipalities, a look at how other jurisdictions handle similar situations
is appropriate. Municipal power to implement moratoria without an ex-
press grant from the legislature is far from uniform in American jurisdic-
tions. Nonetheless, under the conventional view, 1°9 courts uphold
moratoria, despite the lack of an express statutory grant of authority, as a
use of delegated police power."0 Other state courts have found sufficient
authority for moratoria in so-called "home rule" provisions."' Where
general land use planning enabling legislation does not expressly author-
ize moratoria, it "may imply delegation of authority to do so.""l 12  For
example, in Miller v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that an emergency zoning measure in the form of
a restriction on multifamily housing within a certain residential district,
pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan, was a valid
104. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
105. See id. at 1037.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 35A.63.220 (2006).
107. See Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1039-40.
108. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 13:10 (4th
ed., rev. 2005).
109. Matthew G. St. Amand & Dwight H. Merriam, Defensible Moratoria: The Law Before
and After the Tahoe-Sierra Decision, 43 NAT. RES. J. 703, 710 (2003); ZIEGLER, supra note 108; see
also Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Mass. 1975) (citing to numerous cases
supporting the court's conclusion that "[t]he weight of authority is that reasonable interim zoning
provisions may be enacted within the scope of a general zoning enabling act, without reliance on
specific statutory authorization for interim ordinances.").
110. This is the police power exception to the harsh application of Dillon's Rule. See discus-
sion infra notes 181, 183.
111. Amand & Merriam, supra note 109. Recall the discussion of the home rule doctrine supra
note 26.




exercise of the municipality's police power. 113 California is an especially
relevant comparison to Washington given that the Washington Constitu-
tion was modeled in part on the California Constitution.' 14 Also, in the
absence of an explicit expression of a contrary purpose by the legislature,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that, under general principles
conferring broad police powers upon municipalities, municipalities have
authority to adopt moratorium ordinances of limited duration, provided
they are enacted in good faith and without discrimination.' 5
Despite the conventional view, a few state courts have held that in
the absence of express statutory authority, local governments lack the
power to enact moratoria.1 16 In Naylor v. Township of Hellam, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a municipality's power to impose a
moratorium on subdivision approvals while revising its comprehensive
zoning plan was invalid, as it was neither implicitly granted nor inciden-
tal to the powers expressly conferred under the planning enabling act in
force.117 Additionally, in Lancaster Dev. Ltd. v. River Forest, the Illinois
Appellate Court held invalid a temporary zoning measure that prevented
the issuance of a permit until three months after the question of amend-
ing the zoning ordinance was referred to the zoning board of appeals.118
In Washington, the power to enact moratoria, in the absence of express
statutory authority, would be tested when Bainbridge Island decided to
suspend permits for shoreline armoring in 2001.
III. CASE HISTORY OF BIGGERS
A. History of the Blakely Harbor Moratorium
A relatively routine exercise of local authority gave rise to the dis-
pute in Biggers. The Bainbridge Island City Council, responding to
113. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 234 P. 381, 388 (Cal. 1925); accord Jablinske v.
Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 851, 626 P.2d 543, 545 (1981); see also Amicus Curiae
Brief of Snohomish County, supra note 17, at 10 (urging adoption of the California model before the
Washington Supreme Court).
114. Brief of Amici Curiae Washington State Department of Ecology and Washington State
Department of Community, Trade and Economic Development at 8, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge
Island, 156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006) (No. 77150-2), 2006 WL 937646 (citing ARTHUR
S. BEARDSLEY, The Sources of the Washington Constitution as Found in the Constitutions of the
Several States, in CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON xxix (1939)).
115. Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Minn. 1976).
116. This is a judicial resolution based on the most restrictive reading of a rule limiting con-
struction of municipal power: Dillon's Rule. See discussion infra notes 181, 183.
117. Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 773 A.2d 770, 775 (Pa. 2001).
118. Lancaster Dev. Ltd. v. River Forest, 228 N.E.2d 526, 529 (111. App. Ct. 1967) (reasoning
that the statute mandated a particular procedure and that an interim zoning measure without notice
and comment fell outside of the statutory authority). Washington has rejected the Lancaster rule.
See Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 851, 626 P.2d 543, 544-45 (1981).
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community pressure concerning the construction of overwater structures
on Blakely Harbor, 1 9 adopted an ordinance on August 22, 2001, to pre-
serve the status quo. 20 The ordinance's specific purpose was "to enable
amendments to the shoreline master program to be completed by Sep-
tember 2002 and to conduct an analysis of cumulative impacts.' ' 1  In
October, the city adopted the moratorium at issue in Biggers. 
22
Substantively, the ordinance contained two significant provisions.
First, the ordinance imposed a limited shoreline moratorium on permit
applications for new overwater construction and new shoreline armor-
ing. 123 Second, the ordinance exempted permits "relating to the construc-
tion of single-family residences, and their normal appurtenances.' 24 The
moratorium restricted applications on new overwater construction and
shoreline armoring because these structures had the "greatest potential to
impact shoreline habitat."'
' 25
Blakely Harbor, located in the southeastern quadrant of the island,
"is one of the last undeveloped harbors in central Puget Sound ....
Bainbridge Island expressed the purpose of the moratorium in simple
terms:
The [m]oratorium is necessary while the [c]ity considers the appro-
priate scientific information, and prepares and considers the revi-
sions to the [s]horeline [m]aster [p]rogram and critical areas ordi-
nance. The [c]ity's land use and planning process, as well as the
protection of critical salmonid habitat, will suffer significant harm if
the [m]oratorium is not in place until the [c]ity completes the revi-
sions to the [s]horeline [m]aster [p]rogram and critical areas ordi-
nance. 127
With the moratorium in place, the city would be able to complete those
revisions and regulate free from the frustrating effects of vested rights
under the old permit requirements and shoreline master plan.
119. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
120. City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-34 (Aug. 22, 2001); Biggers v. City of
Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 861, 103 P.3d 244, 245 (2004).
121. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 5.
122. City of Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2001-45 (Oct. 10, 2001).
123. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 6 (reciting portions of the
ordinance).
124. 1d.
125. Biggers, 124 Wash. App. at 861, 103 P.3d at 245.
126. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
127. Id. at 9.
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B. The Biggers Opinion
The plaintiff property owners prevailed on their original challenge
of the moratorium at trial when the court granted their motion for sum-
mary judgment. 28  Bainbridge Island filed an appeal with Division
Two. 129 Answering the question of whether the moratorium was valid,
the court of appeals held that it was not and affirmed the trial court's de-
cision. 30 The court presented a curt, twofold rationale. First, rejecting
the city's argument that it had authority to enact a moratorium under ei-
ther the Code or the GMA, 13 1 the court interpreted the absence of a mora-
torium provision in the SMA as providing no textual basis for morato-
rium authority in the SMA. 132 Second, the court rejected the city's ar-
gument that the GMA "applies to shoreline development, to the exclu-
sion of the SMA or the [c]ity's [shoreline master plan]. 133 Rather, the
court held that the GMA clearly specifies that the SMA "governs the
unique criteria for shoreline development."1 34 The court continued by
stating that the "SMA trumps the GMA in this area, and the SMA does
not provide for moratoria on shoreline use or development."' 35 Next,
each of these rationales will be considered in turn.
1. Specific Holding: Statutes as Islands
Though the court was terse in its rejection of the argument that ei-
ther the GMA or the Code can provide the necessary moratorium author-
ity, the subtext of this rationale is quite apparent. To wit, these statutes
do not interrelate; they are islands in the law. Thus, without an express
grant of power by the state legislature, the municipality has no power to
enact moratoria for shoreline development permits under the SMA. In
order to reach such a conclusion, the court adhered to a version of strict
construction of local government authority. 36 In its opening brief before
the court of appeals, the city cited to Weden v. San Juan County137 for the
proposition that a court will "not interpret a statute to deprive a munici-
pality of the power to legislate on particular subjects unless that clearly is
128. Biggers, 124 Wash. App. at 862, 103 P.3d at 246.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 867, 103 P.3d at 249.
131. Id. at 866, 103 P.3d at 248.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 866-67, 103 P.3d at 248.
134. Id. at 867, 103 P.3d at 248-49.
135. Id.
136. See discussion regarding Dillon's Rule infra Part IV.B and notes 181, 183.
137. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998).
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the legislative intent." 138 Any mention of Weden is notably absent from
the court's opinion, but the court's application of the rule from City of
Spokane v. J-R Distribs139 indicates that the Weden rule was impliedly
rejected.
The court reasoned that the Code does not apply because it is "lim-
ited to planning and zoning," and that the GMA does not apply because it
is "limited to growth management in selected counties and cities. 14°
The opinion continued: "Thus, neither statute grants the authority the
[c]ity describes .... ,,141 Neither of these structural arguments addresses
the Weden rule, that silence runs in favor of the municipality, subject to
the three-part test, but they do support the assertion that the court implic-
itly rejected Weden in favor of the rule in J-R Distribs., that statutory
silence runs against the municipality. Recall that the court in Matson
determined that the statutory moratoria language was an express grant of
power rather than a limitation thereof 142 The Biggers court did not cite
to Matson, but the implication is clear: If the enabling statute did not give
the municipality the power, the municipality does not possess it-a no-
tion diametrically opposed to Weden.
2. Specific Holding: GMA/SMA Interplay
The Biggers court rejected a second argument by the city that con-
tended the moratoria provisions of the GMA apply to the exclusion of the
SMA or the city's shoreline master program. 143 In actuality, the city's
argument was more nuanced, asserting that a harmonization of the provi-
sions of the GMA and the SMA necessarily led to a conclusion that
Bainbridge Island had the power to enact the moratorium.1 44 The city
urged that in enacting the GMA, the legislature anticipated that changes
to comprehensive plans would be performed under the statute. 145  The
138. City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting Weden at 695, 958
P.2d at 281-82).
139. City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784, 786 (1978)
("[A municipal corporation] has neither existence nor power apart from its creator, the legislature,
except such rights as may be granted to municipal corporations by the state constitution.").
140. Biggers, 124 Wash. App. at 866, 103 P.3d at 248.
141. Id.
142. Matson v. Clark County Bd. of Comm'rs, 79 Wash. App. 641, 643, 904 P.2d 317, 318
(1995).
143. Biggers, 124 Wash. App. at 866-67, 103 P.3d at 248.
144. See City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 40.
145. See id. at 35 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.130(l)(a) (2004)). This statute reads:
Each comprehensive land use plan and development regulations shall be subject to con-
tinuing review and evaluation by the county or city that adopted them. Except as other-
wise provided, a county or city shall take legislative action to review and, if needed, re-
vise its comprehensive land use plan and development regulations to ensure the plan and
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city asserted that statutory language within the GMA indicates that
shoreline master programs are to be considered part of the city's com-
prehensive plan under the GMA.146  Thus, changes to comprehensive
plans can be aided by the use of moratoria power granted by the GMA
147
to preserve the status quo during the reconsideration period.
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on language from the
GMA stating that a shoreline master program shall be adopted pursuant
to the procedures of the SMA. 148 The court reasoned that "the GMA
states that the provisions of the [SMA] take priority over the GMA as
long as the provisions are internally consistent .... The GMA clearly
specifies that [the SMA] governs the unique criteria for shoreline devel-
opment."' 149  Finally, the court concluded that the "SMA trumps the
GMA in this area, and the SMA does not provide for moratoria on shore-
line use or development., 150 One must certainly infer from the court's
strict constructionist approach that only an express grant by the legisla-
ture, in the SMA, would have satisfied the court in its review of the city's
action.151
3. Subsequent Response to the Decision
Soon after the Biggers opinion came down, the Court of Appeals of
Washington, Division One, disagreed with the Biggers court's interpreta-
tion of the GMA/SMA interplay.1 52 In Preserve Our Islands v. Shoreline
Hearings Bd., a citizen's group and King County appealed the Shoreline
Hearings Board's order requiring the County to issue shoreline develop-
ment permits to an aggregate mining company for expansion of its load-
ing dock, located on the southeastern shore of Maury Island." 3 Under
the GMA, the company's central mining operation on the island was des-
ignated as a mineral resource land. 154 Because the court accepted the
regulations comply with the requirements of this chapter according to the time periods
specified in subsection (4) of this section.
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.130(l)(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
146. See City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 40 (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.70A.480(l) (2006) ("The goals and policies of a master program adopted under the SMA
are considered to be an element of a city's comprehensive plan required under the [GMA].").
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.390 (2006).




151. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.I.
152. See Pres. Our Islands v. Shoreline Hearings Bd., 133 Wash. App. 503, 137 P.3d 31
(2006).
153. Id. at 509, 137 P.3d at 34.
154. Id.
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argument that the dock loading operation-although physically separated
from the central mining operation-was part of the total mining opera-
tion, it held that the company was entitled to a shoreline development
permit because the mining operation was "water dependent," as defined
in the GMA.'55
The court of appeals rejected the appellants' contention that, despite
its mineral use designation under the GMA, comprehensive plan, and
zoning code, such a designation did not affect the principal use of the
company's docking facility. Employing the rule of Biggers, the appel-
lants asserted that the SMA takes priority over the GMA for shoreline
development. 156 The court disagreed, reasoning that the section of the
GMA relating to the SMA "does not say that, and in fact it requires that
regulations implementing the two statutes be harmonized in the process
of overall land use planning and regulation."' 157 Moreover, the court
stated:
[The GMA] specifically states that a county's shoreline master pro-
gram goals and policies are part of that county's GMA comprehen-
sive plan, and the [c]ounty's shoreline master program regulations
are development regulations. Consistent with this provision, the
GMA defines "[d]evelopment regulations" as "the controls placed
on development or land use activities by a county or city, including,
but not limited to ... shoreline management programs." In accor-
dance with the GMA, the County adopted its Shoreline Policies as
part of its comprehensive plan and its Shoreline Code as part of its
GMA development regulations. [The GMA] states that develop-
ment regulations must be consistent with and implement the com-
prehensive plan. Any other interpretation would create chaos in at-
tempts to implement and apply the numerous, varied and sometimes
competing policies and regulations governing the use of land.' 58
If that line of reasoning sounds familiar, it is because it was essentially
the same argument made by the city of Bainbridge Island in Biggers.
Ironically, where Bainbridge Island would use GMA authorization to
permit its implementation of a moratorium to change its shoreline mas-
ter plan without the specter of vested rights, the mining company in Pre-
serve Our Islands would transplant its permit requirement satisfaction
under the GMA in order to bypass independent scrutiny of its shoreline
development purposes.
155. Id. at 510, 137 P.3d at 34.
156. Id. at 522, 137 P.3d at 41.
157. Id. at 523, 137 P.3d at 41.
158. Id. at 524, 137 P.3d at 42 (internal footnotes omitted).
159. See discussion supra Part III.B and accompanying footnotes.
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While the cases are quite different factually, this common issue, at a
certain level of abstraction, unites them. At the core of both these sce-
narios is the question of whether the GMA can supplant the SMA or
whether there is a dividing line of jurisdiction between the two statutes.
While Preserve Our Islands is probably a better factual pattern for the
specific test 160 of GMA/SMA interplay than is Biggers-as the former
involved shoreline permitting for one private entity-its reasoning, that
the two regulatory acts be harmonized as part of one development regu-
latory scheme, directly opposes the reasoning supporting the non-
overlapping jurisdiction theory of Biggers. 161
C. Problems with the Result
As the court in Preserve our Islands suggested, the result of the
Biggers court's holding is that municipalities and developers will be sub-
ject to odd and incongruous results going forward. For instance, because
the court in Biggers recognized that both the Code and the GMA author-
ize municipalities to enact moratoria, 162 if a town wishes to change its
master plan anywhere but 200 feet shoreward of the ordinary high water
mark, 163 it may employ a moratorium while it considers its options. If
the planning changes are to affect the land within the designated zone of
control under the SMA, however, then a municipality's choices are lim-
ited to: (1) not enacting changes to a master plan; (2) hastily enacting
changes, thus inviting error and ill-conceived rulemaking; or (3) enacting
far-more-restrictive shoreline master plans initially and subsequently
loosening the restrictions.
164
Shoreline management plans, like other land use master plans, are
not carved in stone. As discussed, a viable moratoria power furthers
many values important to municipalities. 65  In addition, a moratoria
160. Ultimately, Biggers is a case about power, rather than statutory harmonization, whereas
Preserve Our Islands presents the statutory harmonization question in sharper form.
161. The term "non-overlapping jurisdiction theory" is used to refer to the Biggers court's
holding that the SMA governs the unique criteria of shoreline regulation. Biggers v. City of Bain-
bridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 867, 103 P.3d 244, 248 (2004).
162. Id. at 865 n.6, 103 P.3d at 247 n.6.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(f) (2006); Buechel v. State Dep't of Ecology, 125
Wash. 2d 196, 884 P.2d 910 (1994).
164. Arguably, this is a point of some contention. If a municipality did this, one might expect
litigation challenging this type of action as an invalid interim zoning control, even though on its face
the regulation would not be defined as interim. Because the SMA does not contain any language
that relates to that option, the approach in Biggers might invalidate it. Additionally, one would
assume significant public opposition to stringent management plans. Either way, this option is far
from ideal.
165. See discussion supra Part II.B. I. Specifically, moratoria prevent piecemeal development,
improve deliberation on planning issues, and allow an appropriate response to emergencies.
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power under the SMA would serve another important normative value-
environmental protection. Where a municipality has recognized a new
environmental threat to the shorelines, or the wildlife habitat thereon, by
development otherwise permitted under existing regulations, it may need
to move quickly to block further development while studying the effi-
cacy of new regulations. Vested rights under prior rules would no doubt
frustrate that effort and allow the newly discovered environmental harm
to occur. Thus, the absence of moratoria authority frustrates the very
purpose of the SMA.
166
IV. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS: A PROBLEM OF POWER
Biggers in the abstract is emblematic of the central tensions in
land use law. How does the law provide the necessary discretion to local
communities to regulate as well as guarantee stability and fairness to pri-
vate property owners? 167 Further, assuming that the proposed regulation
is reasonable, from where is that discretionary power to be drawn?
To extinguish Biggers' incongruity with municipal power under
other planning statutes and the Washington Constitution, the Washington
Supreme Court should reverse and remand this decision.1 68 There are
two existing legal theories under which the Supreme Court could hold
that a municipality's power to enact moratoria exists under the SMA-or
at least without offending the SMA. First, the court could adopt the ap-
proach used in Preserve Our Islands, thereby harmonizing the SMA and
the GMA and allowing a municipality to derive its authority from the
GMA. Second, the court could reinforce Weden and allow cities to rely
on their constitutionally delegated police powers. Under a third theory,
not argued before the court, a municipality charged with administering
permit programs could be considered an administrative agency for the
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2006) ("There is ... a clear and urgent demand for a
planned, rational, and concerted effort, jointly performed by the federal, state, and local govern-
ments, to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's
shorelines.") (emphasis added).
167. See generally DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 44 (2d ed.
2004).
168. The Washington Supreme Court has granted review. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island,
156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006). The city has since adopted its updated shoreline man-
agement plan. Bainbridge Island, Wash., Ordinance 2003-30 (Sept. 10, 2003). Other homeowners
in the Blakely Harbor area challenged the new plan, but before litigation on the merits, the city and
the homeowners settled out of court, staying the pending litigation in both state and federal court.
Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release of Claims, & Hold Harmless Agreement, Samson v. City of
Bainbridge Island, No. C05-5197RJB (W.D. Wash Aug. 29, 2006), available at www.ci.bainbridge-
isl.wa.us/documents/Blakely%20Harbor/2OFinal%20Settlement.pdf. The settlement agreement
recognizes that the Washington Supreme Court will render an opinion, but that on remand the parties
will move to stay the litigation pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id. at 8.
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purposes of the SMA and afforded the concomitant measure of judicial
deference. Both the positive and negative aspects of each of these ap-
proaches are next explored.
A. Derivative Statutory Authority
The Washington Supreme Court has granted review of Biggers,
169
but has not, as of this writing, granted review in Preserve Our Islands. If
it chooses to reverse Biggers, the court could rule that the SMA is not the
exclusive regulatory scheme for the "various shorelines of the state,"'
170
and it could hold that when a municipality wishes to update any part of
its comprehensive plan, it may employ the GMA's grant of moratoria
authority. To do so, the court must untangle a web of statutory provi-
sions in which there is often conflicting language. It is a risky proposi-
tion, for if the court prioritizes one statute over the other, it will no doubt
be accused in certain circles of judicially expanding the GMA, a charge
that will not be without merit. A commentator has noted that the
GMA was born amid controversy, whereas the SMA arose from consen-
sus. 172 If the court is seen as allowing the GMA to swallow the SMA to
some degree, negative reaction to the opinion would be reasonably
grounded on a contention that the court has allowed the expansion of a
controversial regulatory program at the expense of a relatively agreeable
program.
At bottom, a holding on the GMA/SMA interplay issue will turn on
theories of jurisprudence advanced by the court. Should the court take a
textualist approach, it could readily hold the SMA "trumps" the GMA in
169. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006).
170. City of Bremerton v. Sesko, 100 Wash. App. 158, 162, 995 P.2d 1257, 1259 (2000) ("Al-
though RCW 90.58.100(1) states that Shoreline Master Programs 'shall constitute use regulations for
the various shorelines of the state,' it does not state that such programs shall be the exclusive land
use regulations of lands located on the shoreline." (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(1)
(2006))).
171. The GMA has not been universally welcomed with open arms. See Richard L. Settle,
Washington's Growth Management Revolution Goes to Court, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 5, 34 (1999).
Some of its more contentious provisions, such as those dealing with critical areas designation, have
produced some measure of political backlash, and the court is not immune to such stirrings. See
generally Lewis Kamb, Justices' Election Dilemma: Can They Be Fair? P-I Review Finds Many
Potential Conflicts of Interest on High Court, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 14, 2005, at AI
(noting that several justices on the current court have reported financial contributions from the
Building Industry Association of Washington); Gregory Roberts, Special-Interest Money Fueling
Judicial Races Groups Pay to Push Specific Ideologies, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15,
2006, at Al. Thus, even if some of its early opponents now accept the GMA as "the status quo,"
Eric Pryne, 1-933 Finds Support Lukewarm, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at BI, if the court is
perceived as judicially expanding this program, the anti-GMA movement might find new life.
172. Settle, supra note 171 (discussing judicial review of GMA provisions).
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its jurisdiction. 173 The GMA mandates that a shoreline management pro-
gram shall be adopted pursuant to the procedures of the SMA rather than
the procedures of the GMA for the adoption of comprehensive plans.
174
The plain meaning of the word "procedure" arguably encompasses using
a moratorium to solidify the status quo while planning proceeds. This
would obviate an approach that would treat a shoreline management plan
as part of a comprehensive plan under the GMA at the point of either
creation or alteration.
Should the court choose to take a structural approach, it could more
easily justify a holding that the GMA's provisions can provide the neces-
sary authority to enact permit moratoria. Under this approach, the court
would need to accept a theory of overlapping jurisdiction between the
SMA and GMA and then hold that under the GMA, shoreline plans are
part of comprehensive plans. It would then follow that any changes to
those plans could be effectuated using powers authorized under the
GMA. This structural approach, however, may have been foreclosed by
the legislature. 175 With respect to the issue of critical areas designation
and regulation, the legislature has explicitly endorsed a non-overlapping
jurisdiction approach. 1
7 6
In many respects, the strict formalism of Biggers is reinforced by
legislative intent and considerations of fairness. First, the legislature, in
implementing the so-called "Everett fix," through its statutory overruling
of a Growth Management Hearings Board decision harmonizing GMA
and SMA provisions, 177 has endorsed the non-overlapping jurisdiction
approach in the context of critical areas designation. Second, though the
original version of the moratorium bill mentioned shorelines, that
173. In other words, the Washington Supreme Court could affirm the holding of the lower
court. Biggers, 124 Wash. App. at 867, 103 P.3d at 248-49.
174. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.480(2) (2006).
175. The state legislature may have spoken to this issue. In recent amendments to the GMA,
the legislature implemented what is known to land use attorneys as the "Everett fix." Telephone
Interview with Laura Kisielius, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Snohomish County, Wash. (Jan. 27,
2007). In a recent decision, the Growth Management Hearings Board attempted to harmonize the
two statutes. Everett Shorelines Coal., Case No. 02-3-0009c (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd. Jan. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/central/decisions/2003/2309c Corrected ESCFDO.htm. The result was
a lengthy opinion, accompanied by a graphical model, detailing how the statutes were meant to work
together. Essentially, the board adopted an overlapping jurisdictional approach. Id. Despite the
board's best efforts, the legislature subsequently adopted amendments that overruled the board's
holding. 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 1693 (codified in relevant part at WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A.480(3) (2006)).
176. 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1694 ("The legislature intends that critical areas within the
jurisdiction of the shoreline management act shall be governed by the [SMA] and that critical areas
outside the jurisdiction of the [SMA] shall be governed by the [GMA].").
177. See discussion supra note 175.
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language appears nowhere in the final version. Third, in view of the
statutory provisions in both acts, it seems that the legislature did not de-
sire that one act take precedent over the other. Finally, as Preserve Our
Islands suggests, a strict non-overlapping jurisdiction approach creates
redundant regulations on private parties that may have fully conformed
to GMA requirements.178
A technically correct opinion on one issue, however, does not nec-
essarily guarantee a just disposition. Thus, the court should consider an-
other way to resolve the underlying questions of municipal power. The
following alternative is preferable because it is a tidier, more satisfying
way of resolving the issue that avoids resorting to overly meddlesome
statutory comparisons.
B. Delegated Police Power: Reinforcing Weden
No case in Washington has specifically held that moratoria fall
within the scope of the municipal police power. Nevertheless, it has
been argued that such a conclusion follows 179 from the myriad of cases
recognizing zoning ordinances as police powers.1 80 In deciding Biggers,
the Washington Supreme Court should rule that moratoria authority is
included within the delegated municipal police power.
Before considering the city's argument that either the Code or the
GMA provided moratoria authority, the court of appeals in Biggers court
cited a principle: "A city exists and derives its authority and power from
the state constitution and the legislature. 'It has neither existence nor
power apart from its creator, the legislature, except such rights as may be
granted to municipal corporations by the state constitution.'
' 181
178. In Preserve Our Islands, the permit applicant had already gone through the GMA permit-
ting process. 133 Wash. App. 503, 510-11, 137 P.3d 31, 35 (2006). Because the GMA and the
SMA have environmental preservation as a common goal, forcing private parties to separately con-
form to both statutes may place a heavier burden on them. The determination of private burdens for
the advancement of the public interest is generally a legislative task, rather than a judicial one. This
problem speaks to the sometimes blinding complexity of land use law in Washington. A call for
reform by way of streamlining the multiple permit processes, in order to provide landowners better
assurances of fairness and predictability, is beyond the scope of this Note.
179. Brief of Amici Curiae Washington State Department of Ecology and Washington State
Department of Community, Trade and Economic Development, supra note 114, at 6.
180. E.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 851 nI, 613 P.2d 1148, 1153 n.1 (1980);
Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 862, 866, 395 P.2d 82, 84 (1964); Donwood, Inc. v. Spokane
County, 90 Wash. App. 389, 395-96, 957 P.2d 775, 778 (1998).
181. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 865, 103 P.3d 244, 247 (2004)
(quoting City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 722, 726, 585 P.2d 784, 786 (1974));
see also Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 304 P.2d 656, 659 (1956). This rule
of construction is actually an invocation of a long-standing principle of municipal authority known
as Dillon's Rule, which states that
20071
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Although the principle addresses power created by statute or by the state
constitution, the court follows with an analysis questioning only whether
the city had statutory authority. The court effectively ignored any argu-
ment based on authority granted under the state constitution. 182 It thus
failed to consider what amounts to a constitutional fallback and one of
the ways in which Dillon's Rule has been broadened in Washington. 1
83
The scope of the police power delegated to municipalities under Ar-
ticle XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution, is as broad as that of
the state, as long as the ordinance is (1) local, (2) not in conflict with
state law, and (3) reasonable. 18 4  In Weden,185 the Supreme Court of
Washington reiterated a rule that represents a continuation of a long line
of cases articulating a willingness to construe municipal police power
broadly. 86 Though the issue in Weden arose due to county action, the
decision can be read to apply to all municipalities enacting ordinances
that are subject to the same restraints on the general grant of power.
More significantly, Weden can be read to hold that all municipalities en-
acting ordinances can take advantage of the Article XI grant of authority
and the accompanying judicial deference accorded municipal acts within
that authority. Such deference would accord significant discretion to
municipalities to react to changing circumstances with regard to land use
planning. As moratoria are tools a municipality would use within that
discretion-specifically for the purpose of reacting to changing circum-
stances-it follows that authority to enact moratoria should be included
under the general grant of police power.
In Biggers, the city argued that Weden should control the outcome
before the court of appeals,187 and did so again in a brief filed with the
local governments have those powers expressly conferred by state constitutional provi-
sions, state statutes, and, where applicable, the home rule charter; those powers necessar-
ily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; and those powers es-
sential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality or quasi corporation.
Sebree, supra note 56, at 158 (citing 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 139 (1989)). Dil-
lon's rule is named after John F. Dillon, an Iowa Supreme Court justice who believed that munici-
palities were at greater risk of improper influence by special interests and that limiting municipal
power was the proper response to that risk. Id.
182. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
183. See Sebree, supra note 56, at 163. Sebree's research indicates that courts may be more
willing to broadly construe municipal police power, as opposed to other powers, under Dillon's
Rule. Id
184. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 692, 958 P.2d 273, 280 (1998).
185. Id.
186. See discussion of Weden supra Part II.A.I and note 26.
187. Though the respondents argued that the city failed to make this argument, Respondents'
Supplemental Brief at 13, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124 Wash. App. 858, 103 P.3d 244
(2004) (No. 30752-9-II), 2006 WL 811753, the city clearly did assert it before the court of appeals,
City of Bainbridge Island's Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 38.
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Washington Supreme Court. 88 This argument is both sound and prefer-
able for several reasons. First, it provides a simple doctrinal method of
resolving statutory silence on this issue. Second, employing Weden pre-
serves a structural system firmly ensconced in Washington law. Finally,
it avoids unnecessary judicial meddling with statute blending.
1 89
To produce a clean result, the state constitution should ultimately
control with regard to this issue. When the court is asked to resolve
whether municipalities have authority to enact certain ordinances when
the legislature is silent on the particular legislation, the court should up-
hold the ordinance if it falls within the municipality's delegated Article
XI power. The court can determine this by applying the Weden three-
part test: A municipal ordinance is within the scope of the delegated
power as long as the ordinance (1) concerns local subject matter, (2) does
not conflict with state law, and (3) is reasonable.1 90
The moratorium at issue clearly meets the first prong of the Weden
test, as it pertains to local shorelines within the geographic boundaries of
the city of Bainbridge Island. The Supreme Court's resolution of this
issue, therefore, will turn on the test's other two prongs.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the satisfaction of the Weden test in
this case is the doctrine of preemption, for if the ordinance is preempted
by the SMA it is invalid.1 91 The court could interpret the SMA as the
sole regulatory system for shoreline development permits, preempting
any municipal action that would regulate shorelines outside of SMA
guidelines. This legal landmine was recognized and addressed by amici
in a brief before the Supreme Court.
1 92
Invalidity of an ordinance can be determined by field preemption if
the state has enacted a statute on the same subject as the ordinance,
"leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction."'1 93 Field preemption turns
on express or necessary implication of intent to preempt the field by the
state legislature.1 94 If the legislature expresses intent to either occupy the
188. This argument was further developed by Snohomish County. See Amicus Curiae Brief of
Snohomish County, supra note 17, at 6.
189. The legislature has viewed such meddling with disfavor. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
190. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 692, 958 P.2d 273, 280 (1998).
191. Of course, if the court continues to rely on the narrowest construction of municipal power
by way of J-R Distributors, this application of Weden may never materialize. See discussion supra
note 181.
192. Brief of Amici Curiae Washington State Department of Ecology and Washington State
Department of Community, Trade and Economic Development, supra note 114, at 9.
193. Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash. 2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353, 354 (1991) (citing Dia-
mond Parking, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 78 Wash. 2d 778, 781, 479 P.2d 47, 49 (1971)).
194. Id. at 560, 807 P.2d at 354 (citing Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 383-84,
617 P.2d 713, 718 (1980)).
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field, or to grant concurrent authority, "there is no room for doubt."' 95 In
the SMA, the state legislature expressed its intent for concurrent author-
ity.196 As noted earlier, the formation of the SMA as a cooperative regu-
latory scheme between the local governments and the Department of
Ecology197 obviates a finding of field preemption.
Invalidity of an ordinance may also arise from conflict preemption
if the statute and the ordinance cannot be harmonized. 198  Concurrent
jurisdiction between the state and municipality is presumed until a con-
flict is demonstrated. 199 The test for determining conflict preemption is
whether an ordinance forbids that which the statute permits.200  Again,
this is what all the shouting is about in the briefs before the court.
Arguably, the moratorium at issue does not conflict with the laws of
the state. The city argued that, because the SMA is silent on the issue of
moratoria, the city's enactment is not in conflict with any express provi-
sion of the statute.2°' In addition, the express goals of the SMA regard-
ing the development of shoreline master programs mandate a preference
for not only the preservation of the natural character of the shoreline
202
but also the protection and ecology of the shoreline.20 3 To the extent that
the moratorium was enacted to alter the shoreline management plan to
advance these goals, it also better effectuates-and thus does not conflict
with- the SMA. Further, if after study it was revealed that the new
shoreline master program would allow for the type of development con-
templated by the respondents, the moratorium would only have produced
a mere delay in the process, not an abdication or prevention thereof.
204
195. Id., 807 P.2d at 354-55 (citing Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 669-70, 388
P.2d 926, 930 (1964)).
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (2006) ("This chapter establishes a cooperative program
of shoreline management between local government and the state. Local government shall have the
primary responsibility for initiating the planning required by this chapter and administering the
regulatory program . ) (emphasis added).
197. Crooks, supra note 50, at 424.
198. Brown, 116 Wash. 2d at 559, 807 P.2d at 354 (citing City of Spokane v. J-R Distribs., Inc,
90 Wash. 2d 722, 730, 585 P.2d 784, 788 (1978)).
199. Baker v. Snohomish County Dep't of Planning & Cmty. Dev., 68 Wash. App. 581, 588,
841 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1992).
200. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 693, 958 P.2d 273, 280-81 (1998) (quot-
ing City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 111, 356 P.2d 292, 296 (1960)).
201. City of Bainbridge Island's Supplemental Brief at 5-6, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge
Island, 156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006) (No. 77150-2), 2006 WL 811752 (distinguishing
Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wash. 2d 550, 551-53, 304 P.2d 656, 657-58 (1956)).
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020(2) (2006).
203. Id. § 90.58.020(4) (emphasis added).
204. See City of Bainbridge Island's Reply Brief at 10, Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island,
156 Wash. 2d 1005, 132 P.3d 146 (2006) (No. 77150-2), 2004 WL 3775336.
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In rebuttal, the respondents and their amici argue that the morato-
rium conflicts with the SMA.2°5 Because the SMA provides an exception
for shoreline armoring and protective bulkheads appurtenant to single
family residences, issuance of a permit to build those structures comports
with the statute.20 6 Thus, the moratorium operates to prevent the issu-
ance of something that would normally be approved under the statute-a
conflict is apparent. The city has presented the more persuasive argu-
ment. Because the moratorium is but a temporary restraint on develop-
ment, and because it better effectuates the overriding values within the
SMA, municipal authority to issue shoreline permit moratoria does not
conflict with the SMA.
The final prong of the Weden test is met if the ordinance "bear[s] a
reasonable and substantial relation to [the] promotion of the general wel-
fare .... ,,207 The question of reasonableness under this test is a question
of law for which the respondents have the burden of proof.20 8 The SMA
expresses the goals of preserving the natural character of the shoreline,20 9
protecting the resources and ecology of the shoreline, 210 and preventing
uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines.
211
For all practical purposes, it may not matter which way the reason-
ableness analysis is resolved. The court should reaffirm the majority rule
that states municipalities may enact moratoria, outside of express statu-
tory authority, by falling back on their delegated police powers under the
state constitution. Put more succinctly, shoreline permit moratoria can
be included within the delegated police power and are not in conflict
with the SMA, as a matter of law. The Supreme Court's application of
Weden here would not guarantee that this particular moratorium is valid,
205. See, e.g., Response Brief, supra note 5, at 31-38.
206. Id.
207. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 692, 958 P.2d 273, 280 (1998) (quoting
Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash.2d 874, 878, 905 P.2d 324, 326 (1995)).
208. Id. at 693, 958 P.2d at 280. Also, the respondent private landowners argue that by not
allowing the permit for the construction of the bulkheads, the city is refusing to enforce standards
that protect single-family residences from damage. Response Brief, supra note 5, at 37. Interest-
ingly, the homeowners argue this point under the conflict prong, rather than the reasonableness
prong. Id. Nonetheless, it is arguable that, because the SMA sets minimum allowances for erosion
protection on lots containing single-family residences, any local regulation which falls below that
standard is both in conflict with the SMA and unreasonable. Ultimately, the presumption of validity
of local police power regulations may prove too much for the homeowners to overcome.
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020(2) (2006).
210. Id. § 90.58.020(4). Recall that the city undertook to change its shoreline management
plan in order to make necessary accommodation for salmonid habitat. The protection of fish is cer-
tainly the protection of a natural resource, just as the protection of fish habitat is the protection of
ecology. Because these goals have been defined in the statute as in the public interest, if a morato-
rium serves to advance them, it is reasonable under Weden.
211. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (2006).
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but it would avoid certain problems manifest in the lower court's deci-
sion.212 For example, the court of appeals' holding could readily be inter-
preted to mean the SMA can never allow for local permit moratoria in its
current state.
However satisfactory a solution the delegated police power may be
to this problem, an alternative concept merits consideration. Ultimately,
the complexity of the SMA's procedures for administering shoreline de-
velopment permits and the role played therein by municipalities lead to
the conclusion that a different legal framework, one involving adminis-
trative law concepts, is in order.
C. Agency Theory: Chevron to the Rescue
One area addressed at the margins in the Biggers dispute, if at all, is
the question of what level of judicial deference, if any, is owed to a mu-
21nicipality interpreting a statute.13 Significant reasons exist to consider
giving some deference to a municipality construing a statute it is charged
with administering by the legislature. A theory of judicial deference to
municipalities would center on another source of power for municipali-
ties in these situations-administrative authority. This theory may be
perceived as unconventional under Washington law, and indeed it proba-
bly is. However, the concept of deference to agencies' interpretation of
statutes they administer is not unknown to Washington law, and it is cer-
tainly well-ensconced in administrative law. Borrowing from this con-
cept will assist in crafting this alternative solution to the Biggers quan-
dary.
In order to receive any sort of deference as an administrative
agency, a municipality would need to be characterized as such. Under
Washington's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),214 "agency" is
defined as:
any state board, commission, department, institution of higher
education, or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to con-
duct adjudicative proceedings, except those in the legislative or
212. This approach avoids an effective argument by the respondents. The landowners argued
that if a court is to hold that the GMA provides moratoria authority to municipalities changing their
SMPs, then only those municipalities who plan under the GMA would receive such a grant. Re-
spondents' Supplemental Brief, supra note 187, at 10. Because the GMA only applies to certain
municipalities based on size, the result would be incongruous. This powerful argument would be
nullified if the court were to either apply Weden or grant judicial deference to a municipality's inter-
pretation of the SMA.
213. In fact, while the city appealed on the grounds that it had wide-ranging authority under
either the Code or the GMA, the city never argued that it had construed the SMA to grant authority
to enact the moratorium.
214. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05 (2006).
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judicial branches, the governor, or the attorney general except to
the extent otherwise required by law and any local governmental
entity that may request the appointment of an administrative law
judge under chapter 42.41 RCW.21 5
A fair reading of the plain text of this provision reveals no mention of
municipalities before the word except, suggesting that the drafters may
not have wanted to include them within the statute. The APA, however,
contains a separate provision excluding certain state entities from its ap-
plication. 16 Notably, municipalities as a class are not present on the list
of excluded entities. Because the legislature did not expressly exclude
municipalities, there are definitely instances where municipalities may
qualify as agencies. Therefore, it is an open question as to whether a
municipality operating within the SMA/GMA could be viewed as an
agency.
Inclusion notwithstanding, the APA defines "agency action" as "li-
censing, the implementation or enforcement of a statute, the adoption or
application of an agency rule or order, the imposition of sanctions, or the
granting or withholding of benefits. 217 Under the SMA, "local govern-
ment[s] shall have the primary responsibility for ... administering the
regulatory program. ,218 Arguably, this responsibility empowers local
government with administrative authority when it is acting pursuant to
the SMA. By identifying and categorizing local shorelines, holding hear-
ings, and creating shoreline master plans-all tasks delegated to the local
governments under the SMA-the local governments are engaged in
"agency action., 219 Thus, while municipalities do not strictly fit within
the statutory definition, those administering the SMA are certainly en-
gaged in agency action.
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(2) (2006).
216. See id. § 34.05.030(l)(a)-(c) (excluding from the purview of the Act the state militia,
board of clemency and pardons, and department of corrections in certain contexts).
217. Id. § 34.05.010(3).
218. Id. § 90.58.050 (establishing a "cooperative program of shoreline management between
local government and the state"). But cf WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.300 (2006) ("The department of
ecology is designated as the state agency responsible for the program of regulation of the shorelines
of the state ...."). If the ordinance passed by the city in this case set a rule for shoreline develop-
ment, rather than simply declared a hold on any permit applications, section 300 would apply. Un-
der the APA, "state agency" is not the relevant term; "agency" is. There is little doubt that the legis-
lature gave Ecology a role to play, but a standard rule of statutory construction dictating that statutes
be read together would place section 300 next to section 050 and lead to the conclusion that the
legislature has created a "cooperative" administrative scheme here, with two "agencies" operating to
effectuate the mandate. In addition, section 300 refers to "shorelines of statewide significance,"
which is a "category of shorelines determined to be of sufficient importance to give the department
more substantial planning authority ... than ... for other shorelines under the SMA." Buechel v.
State Dep't of Ecology, 125 Wash. 2d 196, 204 n.23, 884 P.2d 910, 916 n.23 (1994).
219. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140 (2006).
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The concept that a municipality is an agent of the state is recog-
220nized in nine states. While the Washington Supreme Court has never
held that a municipality cannot qualify as an agency, a lower court has
held that the APA did not apply to a county council's application of a
road ordinance to a particular parcel of land, though the court did not
provide a reason for refusing to apply the APA.221 If adopted, the treat-
ment of municipalities as agencies could be sufficiently constrained by
deeming them quasi-agencies. Such a rule could specify that when a
municipality is charged with administering a particular statute, it operates
as a quasi-agency; doctrines of administrative law could then apply to
guide judicial review of municipal action in these limited circumstances.
Once the threshold is crossed and municipalities acting under the
SMA are treated as agencies for the purpose of review, Washington's
version of the APA would then apply. Judicial review of a dispute of this
type would be controlled by the APA's provisions, 222 and the burden of
proving invalidity would fall on the challenger. 223 To take this theory to
its apex, the court could apply the judicial deference rule of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.224 The Chevron
rule, while not perfectly applicable in this situation,225 could nonetheless
be used to solve the problem presented by Biggers.
The underlying theory of Chevron deference would not prevent ap-
plication to state agencies. Chevron deference is given to agencies by
courts because Congress has granted them authority, through an enabling
act, to administer some matters over which their particular expertise
could be brought to bear.226 Agencies are given deference because it is
presumed that some measure of added competence or expertise is present
220. EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.08.10 (3rd ed. 1999)
("[A municipal corporation] is variously described as an arm of the state, a miniature state, an in-
strumentality of the state, an agency of the state .... ") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
221. Chaussee v. Snohomish County Council, 38 Wash. App. 630, 636-37, 689 P.2d 1084,
1091 (1984) (stating that the APA did not apply because a county council was not a state agency);
see also Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local No. 598 v. Wash. Pub. Power Sys., 44 Wash. App.
906, 910-11, 724 P.2d 1030, 1033-34 (1986) (holding that WPPS was a municipal corporation, not
a state agency, under the APA). While the WPPS holding may appear to conflict with Chaussee, the
cooperative arrangement between the local governments and the state agency in the SMA are in fact
distinguishable from that involving a municipal power company.
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (2006).
223. Id. § 34.05.570(1)(a); Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 84
Wash. App. 401, 405, 929 P.2d 1120, 1122 (1996) (holding that an administrative agency may adopt
a regulation that effectively modifies or amends a statute and that the party seeking to overturn the
regulation bears the burden of proof).
224. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
225. The roadblock to applying Chevron deference in this situation is clear: Chevron applies
only to federal agencies.
226. See Sebastian v. State, Dep't of Labor and Indus., 142 Wash. 2d 280, 291-94, 12 P.3d
594, 599-601 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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within the agency, more so than the general legislative body.227 Simi-
larly, local governments charged with administering statewide programs
for their specific jurisdiction are in a position of greater knowledge about
their jurisdiction. The rule effectively works to give agencies the benefit
of the doubt on discretionary matters when Congress has been silent on a
particular issue.
Biggers presents a logical corollary. Under the SMA, the state leg-
islature, recognizing the importance of local government expertise with
regard to the shorelines within their jurisdiction, created this cooperative
program vesting authority in the municipalities for the administration of
the permit program. Moreover, the creation of the SMA began with a
rejection of an approach that would have placed all the authority within
Ecology.228 Taken together, these facts support a conclusion that the leg-
islature intended to give local governments some discretion over local
regulation of shorelines.
Should the court decide to approach the case using this method, it
could apply the basic framework of Chevron to this case, which would
raise two questions. First, has the legislature spoken directly to the is-
sue? Second, is the municipality's construction of the statute permissi-
ble?229 The threshold question is easily answered: No express language
exists in the SMA pertaining to moratoria-the word "moratorium" does
not even appear.
The question of permissible construction is arguably answered in
the affirmative in Biggers. Given the importance of moratoria in the
planning process, 230 the recognition of authority in other statutes by
which the municipality is bound, and the express grant of authority to
administer the permit program under the SMA, an interpretation by the
local government that it also had the power to place a hold on the permit
procedure is permissible under the SMA.231
V. CONCLUSION
Municipalities should have consistent, congruent authority to
enact permit moratoria under the SMA. If the Washington Supreme
227. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
228. Crooks, supra note 50, at 424.
229. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
230. See discussion supra Part II.B. I and accompanying footnotes.
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(3) (2006) ("The local government shall establish a pro-
gram, consistent with rules adopted by the department, for the administration and enforcement of the
permit system provided in this section. The administration of the system so established shall be
performed exclusively by the local government.").
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Court is not willing to conclude as much, the legislature should amend
the SMA and correct its oversight from 1992. The traditional justifica-
tions for moratoria power as part and parcel of planning authority-
increased public input, improved empirical data, more carefully tailored
plans, and the prevention of piecemeal development-apply no less
strongly to planning to preserve one of the states most vital and fragile
resources, its shorelines.
Further, the risks of withholding a shoreline permit moratoria
power-poorly drafted and unclear master plans, overly restrictive
measures potentially leading to takings claims, shorter comment periods,
and piecemeal development as a result of vested rights-are imminent.
Municipalities must possess this power in order to prevent these risks
from materializing.
